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Abstract
It is shown that, in a dynamic competition, an exogenous horizontal
merger is pro￿table even if a small share of active ￿rms merge. However,
each ￿rm has incentive to remain outside the merger because it would ben-
e￿t more (Insiders￿dilemma). We show that in an in￿nite repeated game
in which the ￿rms use trigger strategies an exogenous bilateral merger can
be pro￿table and the Insiders￿dilemma is mitigated.
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11 Introduction
The model by Salant, Switzer and Rynolds (1983)(henceforth, SSR) can be
considered a seminal paper on horizontal mergers pro￿tability. They construct
a symmetric linear Cournot model with ￿xed number of ￿rms and homogenous
product where number of merger candidates is exogenously given. In this model
the motives for the merger are to reduce competition and increase market power
by abstracting from cost saving. Their main results are the following: a merger
is pro￿table if and only if at least the 80% of the active ￿rms merge1, and each
￿rm has an incentive to stay out even if the merger will be pro￿table (Insider￿ s
dilemma). These results are clearly in contrast with the observation that, in
the real word, relative low size mergers (bilateral mergers) are observed in all
industries, even when the merging ￿rms face similar costs.
We are the ￿rst to show that if the number of merging ￿rms is exogenous,
then a bilateral merger among symmetric competitors is always pro￿table and
the incentive to remain outside is mitigated.
The reason of the results in SSR is the following: when an exogenous num-
ber of ￿rms merge, the new single entity (Insiders group) produces less than
the sum of the quantities produced by each merging ￿rm in absence of the
merger2. In a Cournot framework, where the best replies of the players are
strategic substitutes, the Outsiders (the remaining ￿rms) react to the merger
by increasing production but by less than the restriction of merged entity. This
reaction implies that the post-merger industry output shrinks but that the re-
sulting increase in price is not enough to make the merger pro￿table for the
Insiders. Furthermore, once the merger has occurred, the Outsiders sell more
at higher price and gain more pro￿t than the merging ￿rms (Stiger 1950).
We show that the problem of unpro￿tability can strongly depend on the
nature of the competition. In particular, we construct an in￿nitely repeated
trigger strategy game in which the two Insiders (entity merged) threaten to
dissolve if the Outsider does not limit its post-merger production. The use of the
trigger strategy allows enforcing the constraint on the Outsider￿ s production over
an in￿nite horizon. This constraint does not let Outsider strongly increase its
production as replies to the merger, therefore the aggregate price remains high
enough to make the merger pro￿table. Furthermore, this constrained production
decreases the positive externality experienced by the not merging ￿rm.
Some papers try to re￿ne SSR remaining in a static contest. Fauli-Oller
(1997) develops a Cournot model with homogenous product and show that if
the market demand is su¢ ciently convex, then the threshold market share of
merging ￿rms required for a merger to be pro￿table moves from 80% to 50%.
Perry and Porter (1985) focus on the cost structures and show that in a
Cournot model with linear demand and homogenous product a bilateral merger
is pro￿table if there are su¢ cient cost savings. They assume that each merging
￿rm has access to an asset of the other Insiders. The exploitation of this new
1A merger is pro￿table if each ￿rm involved in the merger (Insider) gains a pro￿t at least
equal to pro￿t gained in absence of merger.
2Farrel and Shapiro (1990) formalize this process.
2asset allows to increase the production at a given average cost.
Some recent papers have tackled this problem in a dynamic contest. They
￿nd that with symmetric competitors the pro￿tability for exogenous merger
does not depend on the number of the Insiders.
Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (2001) and Benchekroun (2003) analyze the prof-
itability of horizontal mergers in the case of dynamic competition with price
stickiness and show that mergers among symmetric ￿rms are pro￿table even if
the Insiders represent a pre merger market share arbitrary small. Kabiraj and
Mukherjee (2003) develop an exogenous speci￿ed symmetric Stackelberg game
and ￿nd that a bilateral merger between a leader and a follower is pro￿table
when the new merged entity behaves like a leader.
However, all the models assuming an exogenous number of the Insiders do
not eliminate the incentive of each ￿rm to remain Outsider.
The ￿rst formalization of Insider￿ s dilemma in a model where the merger size
is endogenously decided by the ￿rms is due to Kamien and Zang (1990). They
construct a model where buying and selling ￿rms simultaneously o⁄er bids and
ask a price to conclude the merger. Nevertheless, they do not solve the Insider￿ s
dilemma because according to their results the merger may not occur despite
the fact that monopoly is pro￿table.
Kamien and Zang (1993) consider a repeated static model and show that
the incentive to remain out of the merger can be mitigated. Lindqvist (2003)
dissolves the Insider￿ s dilemma by constructing a three-stage model where a
￿rm can buy a share in a competitive ￿rm before an acquisition of another ￿rm
occurs (outsider-toeholds). He shows that the possibility of buying an outsider-
toehold makes each acquiring ￿rm able to increase its pro￿tability by stealing
part of the Outsider￿ s pro￿t.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we reformulate the model of
SSR (1983) as a two-stage static game. In section 3 we use this two-stage game
as constituent game at an in￿nitely repeated dynamic game. In Appendix B we
show that could exist an equilibrium in which the incentive to remain Outsider
is completely solved.
32 The two-stage static game
The game described in this section if formally equivalent to the one under analy-
sis in SSR. The purpose of this re-formulation is to construct a two-stage static
game we will use as constituent game of the in￿nitely repeated dynamic game
in section 3.
2.1 The game
We consider a market in which n identical ￿rms compete with the aim of max-
imizing individual pro￿t. They each supply the same homogeneous product.
Consumers￿inverse demand for the good is given by:




where p is the price and qi is the output produced by the i￿th ￿rm, a > 0.
The cost function of each ￿rm is assumed to be linear and is given by:
C (qi) = cqi; i = 1;:::;n (2)
where c > 0; and a > c.
The choice of such cost function it motivated by the necessity to focus the
analysis only on the anticompetitive aspect of the horizontal mergers; the ab-
sence of ￿xed cost and the fact that the marginal costs are equal means that
there is no e¢ ciency gains deriving from the merger. Hence, the only objective
of the merging ￿rm in this paper is simply to increase its market power.
As in SSR, we allow an exogenous number of ￿rms m to merge and take
their quantity decision to maximize their joint pro￿t. These ￿rms will be named
Insiders. We assume that n > m ￿ 2: For notational simplicity, the potentially
merging ￿rms are those indexed from 1 to m; the generic merging ￿rm is denoted
by l, where l = 1;:::;m: The not merging ￿rms are referred to as Outsiders, and
are indexed from m + 1 to n ; the generic ￿rm not merging is denoted by j,
j = m + 1;:::;n. Since production cost is linear, any merged entity will be
indi⁄erent with respect to how to split its total output among the Insiders,
hence every coalition of ￿rms (or merged entity) behaves as a single ￿rm.
We analyze a simple two-stage game, whose structure is illustrated in the
Fig. 1.
At stage 1 of the game m ￿rms/players can choose whether to enter a merg-
ing agreement. We stress the important assumption that the number and the





The Insiders decide if merger or not
(agreement) Stage 1
Merger No Merger
FIG. 1 The game tree
When entering the merging agreement, the ￿rm agrees that, in the following
stage, it will o⁄er 1
m of the quantity maximizing the joint pro￿t of the m ￿rms
or, otherwise, it will have to pay an in￿nitely high penalty payment3.
The merger occurs when the potential Insiders forecast they can obtain a
pro￿t at least equal than in the absence of the agreement. In the stage 2 of
the game, once the decision about merging is taken, a Nash-Cournot game
takes place with, possibly, the merged ￿rms choosing their quantity facing the
additional constraint deriving from the merger agreement.
In Fig. 1 the second stage is composed by two sub-games starting from two
di⁄erent nodes (2a and 2b) and all the players ￿nd themselves at the two nodes,
depending on the choice of the potential Insiders on merge. In both sub-games
all players choose simultaneously their quantity as in standard Cournot game.
We assume that the information is perfect in the sense that players perfectly
know the past history of the game at each stage in which they are taking an
action. Because the structure of the game described above, the equilibrium
concept adopted is that of sub-game perfect equilibrium (Selten 1975). The














Aql ￿ cql: (3)
3Instead of such merging agreement it would be possible to assume that after the merger
the Insiders give the managment of the merged entity to a single manager and he certantly
will not cheat himself.
5with l = 1;:::;m
















Aqj ￿ cqj. (4)
with j = m + 1;:::;n
For future ease of notation, it is useful to de￿ne here as ￿ the aggregate
pro￿ts of the merging entity; in the case of merger, these are given by
￿(Q;qm+1;:::;qn) =
0





AQ ￿ cQ; (5)
where clearly Q =
Pm
l=1 ql is the aggregate output produced by the merging
entity.
Hence, the only di⁄erence between the two sub-games is the problem faced











We recall that the static game presented in this section will be used as
constituent game of the in￿nitely repeated dynamic game in section 3.
2.2 The equilibrium of the game
This section characterizes the equilibrium of the game under analysis.
We ￿rstly characterize the equilibrium of the two sub-games (2a and 2b)
forming the second stage.
Consider ￿rst the sub-game in the case in which the merger has not occurred
in stage 1. In stage 2 the game is at the node 2b and all ￿rms simultaneously
choose their best replay to the quantity set by the rivals. It simply is an appli-
cation of linear Nash-Cournot game so each ￿rm i chooses qi 2 R+ to maximize
6its pro￿t given indi⁄erently by (3) or (4), with i = 1;:::;n: The quantity chosen
by the ￿rms is given by the standard Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantities with
































Let ￿C (:) be the equilibrium pro￿t for the whole group composed by the m












Consider now the sub-game in the case in which the merger has occurred in
stage 1. This sub-game starts from node 2a. However, in order not to pay the
in￿nitely high penalty in case of deviation from the merging agreement, each







QM (qm+1;:::;qn) ￿ argmax￿(Q;qm+1;:::;qn); (12)
while each Outsider maximizes (4), and chooses a quantity:
qM







with j = m + 1;:::;n:
7Because each player simultaneously chooses its quantity and all of them have












n ￿ m + 2
: (15)
Now let ￿M (:)and ￿M
j (:) be the pro￿t of the merged entity and the pro￿t
for each Outsider respectively after that merger has occurred. Denote also by
￿M












n ￿ m + 2
￿2


























with l = 1;::;m
Having characterized the players￿equilibrium pro￿ts for both sub-games of
stage 2 , we can now turn to characterizing the SPE of the whole game.
This is done in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the two-stage static game is as follows:
-if m
n < 0:8
stage 1: Insiders do not sign merging agreement,
stage 2: each potential merging ￿rm and Outsider respectively produce the Nash-
Cournot equilibrium quantity. That is
ql = qj = qC
l = qC
j with l = 1;:::;m and j = m + 1;:::;n (18)
8-if m
n > 0:8
stage 1: Insiders merge,
stage 2: each Insider and Outsider respectively produces:
ql = qM
l and qj = qM
j (19)
In the stage 1 the Insiders anticipate this equilibrium pro￿t and decide to
merge and enter the agreement if they forecast gaining a joint pro￿t at least
























Note that as SSR predicted, the Insider decides to merge only if the level of




is higher than 0:80%:
Let￿ s come back to the analysis of the SPE. The Proposition shows that the
potential Insiders prefer to merger if and only if their pre-merger market share
is su¢ ciently high.
The reason is the following. In stage 1 the potential Insiders forecast that
their joint pro￿t will depend on their pre-merger market share. They know that
if the ratio m
n is su¢ ciently low ( in particular m
n < 0:8) their joint pro￿t will be
less than the sum of each pre-merger pro￿t (status quo). Therefore, the optimal
choice for them will be no merging so that in stage 2 a standard Nash-Cournot
game with n players and n ￿rms takes place. The equilibrium pro￿ts for each
Outsider and potential merging ￿rm are given by equation (9).
Consider now the case in which merging ￿rms represent su¢ ciently high
pre-merger market share(m
n > 0). In this case at stage 1 the potential Insiders
anticipate that their joint pro￿t will be at least equal to the sum of each pre
merger pro￿t so from their point of view the merger will be pro￿table and the
optimal choice will be merging. In stage 2 a standard Nash-Cournot game with
n players and n￿m+1 ￿rms takes place and the equilibrium pro￿ts respectively
for each Insider and outsider are given by equation (16) and (17).
So I can state the following result:
Proposition 2 : the pro￿tability of the merger for the Insiders increases in m
n :
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above proposition illustrates that the incentive to participate in a merger
strongly depends on the relative size of the merged entity. The higher the size
more pro￿table will be the merger for the Insiders.
9Consider the case in which the relative size of the merger is su¢ ciently low
(m
n < 0:8). In such a market the number of ￿rms not entering the merger is
relatively high, therefore the negative e⁄ect on the aggregate price due to the
increase in the Outsiders￿production is more stronger.
However, the above results con￿rm that each ￿rm has the incentive to be-
come Outsider because it would bene￿t more (Insider￿ s dilemma). The reason
for this is the following. The formation of the merged entity creates positive
externality on ￿rms remaining outside the merger because the aggregate price
increases but the Outsiders do not need to decrease their production.
Let￿ s assume ￿￿
S is the di⁄erence between the pro￿t of Outsider and Insider

















The subscript S stresses the fact that this di⁄erence is computed in static
framework.











> 0 with m ￿ 2: (22)
We now turn to analyzing the quantity choice of the Outsider which grants
the pro￿tability of the merger in a situation in which the merger itself would be
unpro￿table if the Outsiders choose their best reply to the rivals. The interest
in the analysis is two fold: ￿rst it further clari￿es the nature of the externality
described above, in the sense that it shows that, after the merger, Outsiders
produce more at a price higher than the pre-merger price. This larger quantity
chosen by the Outsiders implies that the post merger industry price does not
increase enough to make the merger pro￿table also for Insiders. Second, the
analysis provides some results that we will use in the rest of the paper when the
2-stage game under analysis is the constituent game of an in￿nitely repeated
dynamic game.
To simplify the analysis we consider a market with three ￿rms where two of
these are allowed to merge. With three ￿rms the study is restricted to the inter-
esting case in which m
n < 0:8 and therefore exists only an unmerged equilibrium
because the merger is unpro￿table4.












with l = 1;2












Since production cost is linear any merged entity will be indi⁄erent with
respect to how to split its total output among the Insiders, hence every coalition
of ￿rms (or merged entity) behaves as a single ￿rm, that is ql = q1 = q2:
Consider the maximization problem for ￿rm 3 in case a merger has occurred
and when a constraint on the pro￿tability of the Insiders is imposed.
The Outsider solves the following problem:
max
q3
￿3 (ql;ql;q3) = (a ￿ 2ql ￿ q3)q3 ￿ cq3; (26)


















The constraints (27) and (28) mean that the Outsider chooses a quantity
such that the pro￿t for the new merged entity formed by ￿rm 1 and 2 (Insiders)
is (weakly) greater than its pro￿t in case of no merger.
The economic reasoning behind constraints (27) and (28) is the following. To
mitigate the positive externality gained by Outsider we constrain its quantity so
that the aggregate market price in post-merger phase remains su¢ ciently high.
Once the Outsider has constrained its production, the cause of the unpro￿tabil-
ity for the Insiders is partially ruled out. Intuitively the solution of problem
(26)-(28) will be a quantity higher than the quantity produced by each pro-
ducer in standard Nash-Cournot game with 3 ￿rms but less than the quantity
each Outsider would produce without constraining its maximization.
The quantities ql and q3 are simultaneously chosen as in the standard Nash-
Cournot game. Notice that despite the Outsider chooses a suboptimal quantity,
it obtains nevertheless higher pro￿ts than in the absence of the merger.
The only di⁄erence with the previous standard Cournot game is that now
Outsider￿ s choices are constrained by (27) and (28).
The Outsider￿ s best reply is derived by solving problem (26)-(28).
The maximum conditions for the Outsider￿ s maximization problem are:
11@L
@q3















where ￿ is the Lagrangian multiplier.
The Outsider￿ s best reply satisfying the conditions (29) and (30) is:
q3 (ql) = ￿
1
16










2(a ￿ c); (32)
q￿




































Pro￿ts in (34) and (35) show that there exists a market outcome (not an
equilibrium) in which a bilateral merger is never unpro￿table for Insiders. In
such an outcome each Insider produces more than the quantity it would produce






















. Given the quantities q￿
l and q￿
3; the positive
externality experienced by the Outsider decreases and the pro￿ts for merged
entity are equal to the sum of the two pre-merger standard Cournot pro￿ts.
Despite in such bilateral merger the Outsider is forced to produce less than its
preferred quantity, it gains a pro￿t higher than the standard Cournot one.
In the next section we construct a dynamic framework to characterize such
market outcome as an equilibrium.
123 Dynamic game
In this section we study an in￿nitely repeated game whose constituent game G
is the 2-stage game of the previous section. The player are three: two Insiders
and one Outsider (￿rm 3).
Now, let G1 (￿) be the supergame formed by in￿nitely repeating the two-
stage game G. In each period t the players take their actions and maximize
the discounted sum of pro￿ts, where ￿i 2 (0;1) is discount factor for each of
them with i = l;3. The discount factor re￿ ects time preference and continuation
probability. Let qt ￿ (qt
l;qt
3) be the quantities chosen in period t respectively by
each Insider and the Outsider, with q 2 b Q (where b Q is the quantity space). We
assume perfect monitoring in the sense that at the end of each stage each player
observes the actions (or equivalently the output) taken by the other players up
to that stage. At the end of period each pro￿t is realized.
Assume that the game starts in period 0, with the null history h0. For t ￿ 1,
let ht be the vector of previous actions undertaken by the players in period up to
t￿1. Let also ht(1) be the vector of previous actions undertaken by the players
up to the ￿rst stage of period t. Let Ht = b Qt￿1 be the set of possible t-period
histories with H1 = f0g and H = [1
t=1Ht the set of all possible histories.
The repeated game strategy for the Insiders and the Outsider are respectively
indicated by sl(ht) and s3(ht(1)).
Now, let us de￿ne the payo⁄s for each player.
The Insider￿ s payo⁄ function is de￿ned as:













while the Outsider￿ s payo⁄ function is:











From section 2 we know that for m = 2 and n = 3 the 2-stage game G has an
unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This equilibrium is characterized
by the following strategies: at stage 1, the Insiders decide not to merge and
at stage 2 the Insiders and the Outsiders play a standard Cournot game. The
reason of this choice is that, at stage 1, the Insiders forecast gaining a joint
pro￿t less than the sum of the pro￿ts gained by each potential Insider in status
quo.
5The repeated game payo⁄s are often normalized by multiplying by (1 ￿ ￿): This normal-
ization factor allows to measure the pro￿t in the stage game and in the repeated game in the
same units
13The aim of this section is to show that the market outcome presented in
32-35 characterizes a sub game perfect equilibrium of supergame G1 (￿).
Firstly we state the following de￿nition:
De￿nition 3 : Let b ht be an history at time t such that up to time t ￿ 1 the
Insiders have always chosen to sign the merger agreement and to choose the
joint-pro￿t best reply ql (q3), and the Outsider has always chosen the constrained
best reply q3 (ql):
De￿nition 4 Let b ht(1) be an history at time t such that up to the ￿rst stage
of time t the Insiders have always chosen to sign the merger agreement and to
choose the joint-pro￿t best reply ql (q3), and up to time t ￿ 1 the Outsider has
always chosen the constrained best reply q3 (ql)
Now, let us de￿ne the following strategy for the Insiders(l) and Outsider(denoted
by 3):
De￿nition 5 Let the Insiders￿ strategy e sl(ht) be de￿ned by the following se-
quence of actions:
Stage 1
￿ if ht = h0, enter the merging agreement (merge, henceforth);
￿ if ht = b ht, merge;
￿ do not merge, otherwise.
Stage 2








De￿nition 6 Let the Outsider￿ s strategy e s3(ht(1)) be de￿ned by the following
sequence of actions:
Stage 1
￿ do nothing ;
14Stage 2
￿ play q3 (ql) if ht(1) = b ht(1);
￿ play qC
3 (q1;q2); otherwise.
De￿nition 5 and 6 enable us to state the proposition representing the main
result of the paper
Proposition 7 Let e ￿3 = 0:15. When e ￿3 < ￿ < 1 the strategy pro￿le fe sl;e s3g are
a SNE of the game





Assume the Insider plays e sl (:): Is e s3 (:) BR6 for the Outsider?











as in (34). See Appendix A for the computation.
Its in￿nite-horizon payo⁄ is then given by














Since "deviation" will trigger a decision not to merger forever by all the
Insiders and there is not lag in the collection of the information from one period
to another, the Outsider￿ s payo⁄ is given by:





Let e ￿3 be the critical value of ￿ such that
1
1 ￿ ￿3





6BR means best reply
15Then, for any ￿ > e ￿3 = 0:157, e s3
￿
ht(1)￿
is BR to e sl (ht):
1.B)
Since there is an in￿nitely high penalty for Insider￿ s unilateral deviation, no
Insider would want (independently from the other Insider) to ￿rstly agree to
merge and then deviate. However, the problem of cooperation between Insiders
and Outsider could remain. At this regard we proceed as in part 1.A.
Assume the Outsider plays e s3 (:) , then e sl (:) is BR for the Insiders?

















Their in￿nite-horizon payo⁄ is then given by:





-if the Insider "deviates" in the second stage despite that in the ￿rst it
played "merge", it will pay in￿nitely high cost. Therefore it never deviates in
stage 2 if it has entered the agreement at stage 1.
However, since "deviation" will trigger a decision not to use constrained best
reply forever by the Outsider and the "cooperative" outcome is weakly preferred
by the Insider to the Cournot outcome, then the Insiders have no incentive to
deviate either at stage 1.
Hence, the Insiders always want to merger in any stage of the game and
e sl (ht) is BR to e s3
￿
ht(1)￿
8 ￿l 2 (0;1):




Let me de￿ne two class of sub-games
Class A: history is b ht
Class B: history is not b ht
For Class A sub-games, previous analysis shows that players￿strategy are
SNE of each sub-games. This is because each sub-game is identical to the whole
game for which we just proved strategies are NE.
Consider Class B games:
Since the Outsider will never play constrained quantity, the Insiders are
better o⁄ adhering to the strategy e sl and not to merging. Since the Insider
will never merge, the Outsider is weakly better o⁄ adhering to the strategy and
removing the constraint from its maximization problem. So in the case of Class
B the strategy for both the Insider and the Outsider is not merging forever,
which is a NE for static game.
7The computation for the value of ￿3 (ql;ql;q3) and e ￿3 are in Appendix A.
16Proposition 7 illustrates that under in￿nite horizon interaction, if the Out-
sider is su¢ ciently patient, then in equilibrium the Insiders remain merged in
every period and the Outsider reacts to this merger by limiting its quantity.
In such a way the merger is never unpro￿table for the potential Insiders and
the Outsider gains higher pro￿t than in absence of merger. This result clearly
reverts the prediction in SSR which show that in a market with linear demand
and constant marginal costs a bilateral horizontal merger is pro￿table if and
only if at least the 80% of the active ￿rms merge.
The same results on the pro￿tability are also found in Dockner & Gauners-
dorfer (2001) and Benchekron (2003). In particular, they apply the "sticky
price model" introduced by Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and study the limit
case in which the prices instantaneously adjust. They use Markovian strategy
and show that the strict pro￿tability for horizontal merger does not depend on
the number of merging ￿rms. However, this Markovian strategy does not allow
them to a⁄ect the incentives for the ￿rms to remain Outsiders.
In our paper, the use of the trigger strategy allows enforcing the constraint
on the Outsider￿ s production over an in￿nite horizon. This constraint does not
let Outsider strongly increase its production as replies to the merger, therefore
the aggregate price remains high enough to make the merger pro￿table.
Proposition 8 Let be n = 3 and m = 2; the sub-game perfect equilibrium




outcome in which the incentive for the Insider to become Outsider is mitigated.
Proof. Let ￿￿
D be the di⁄erence between the pro￿ts in 34 and 35. Is is
de￿ned as follows:
￿￿
D = ￿3 (q￿
3;q￿












with l = 1;2:























Proposition 8 says that the di⁄erence between the pro￿ts gained by the
Outsider and the Insider in static contest is higher than the di⁄erence between
the pro￿ts they gain in each period of the dynamic game. The reason is because
in the SNE, in each period the Outsider reacts to the merger by not increasing
its production too much. This less "aggressive" response by the Outsider implies
that, once the merger has occurred, the aggregate price remains su¢ ciently high
to rule out the unpro￿tability for the Insiders. The constraint on the quantity
17reduces the positive externality that the Outsider exploits after the merger,
therefore the incentive for the Insider to become Outsider decreases and the
Insider￿ s dilemma is mitigated.
The use of trigger strategy would also allow us to characterize a sub-game
Nash equilibrium in which the merger is strictly pro￿table for both the Insider
and the Outsider, and the incentive for remaining outside the merger completely
disappears. To achieve such equilibrium we just need to construct a trigger
strategy in which the Outsider is forced to produce less than the quantity of the
Insider. In this outcome, despite that the quantity of the Outsider is strongly
low, the aggregate price is so high that after the merger, the Outsider still
gains higher pro￿t than in the status quo. We characterize this equilibrium in
Appendix B.
4 Conclusions
This paper shows that, in a dynamic framework, a bilateral horizontal merger
between symmetric ￿rms is never unpro￿table and the incentive to remain Out-
sider is mitigated. We construct an in￿nitely repeated two-stage game where
the number of the merger participants is exogenously given. At stage 1, the
Insiders can choose whether to enter a merging agreement. The merging agree-
ment entails that, when entering the agreement, the ￿rm chooses to o⁄er 1
m of
the quantity maximizing the joint pro￿t of the m ￿rms or, otherwise, it will
have to pay an in￿nitely high penalty payment. At stage 2, a Cournot game
takes place.
Given the structure of the game, we ￿nd an equilibrium in trigger strategies
such that the Insiders threaten to dissolve or not to merger if the Outsider does
not limit its post-merger production. The limitation on the Outsider reaction
determines the results of the paper in a fundamental way. Firstly, if the ￿rms
remaining out of the merger do not strongly increase their quantity, then the
post-merger aggregate price remains su¢ ciently high and the unpro￿tability for
the Insiders is ruled out. Secondly, this quantity constraint reduces the positive
externality gained by the Outsider with the consequence that the incentive to
remain out of the merger is mitigated.
Several papers study the pro￿tability of horizontal mergers in the case of
both endogenous and exogenous merging process. Salant and alter (1983) is
considered the seminal paper belonging to the latter approach. They predict
that, in a static framework where the number of merging ￿rms is exogenously
given, a bilateral horizontal merger between symmetric competitors is not prof-
itable and each ￿rm has an incentive to remain out of the merger because it
would bene￿t more (Insider￿ s dilemma).
The most recent studies have partially countered these results. Dockner &
Gaunersdorfer (2001) and Benchekron (2003) develop a sticky price dynamic
model in Markovian strategies where the merger results from an exogenous
change in the number of active ￿rms. They ￿nd that the pro￿tability for the
horizontal mergers does not depend on the number of merging ￿rms. However
18the drawback of these papers is that the Insider dilemma, predicted by Stiger
and formalized by SSR, still remains: each ￿rm has incentive to remain Outsider,
despite the merger is pro￿table.
Lindqvist (2003) is the ￿rst to solve the Insider dilemma in a model where the
merger process is endogenously determined by the ￿rms. He constructs a model
where each ￿rm can buy a share in a competitive ￿rm before an acquisition of
another competitor. The acquisition of this share allows the Insider to increase
its pro￿tability by stealing part of the Outsider￿ s pro￿t.
We are the ￿rst to show that, in a model where the number of merger par-
ticipants is exogenous, a bilateral horizontal merger between symmetric ￿rms
is pro￿table and the Insider dilemma is eliminated. As in Dockner & Gauners-
dorfer (2001) and Benchekron (2003), we use an in￿nitely repeated game, but
the di⁄erence is that we ￿nd an equilibrium in trigger strategy. Di⁄erently from
the Markovian strategy used in Dockner & Gaunersdorfer and Benchekron, the
trigger strategy allows the merger participants to force the Outsider on not to
strongly increase its production as replay to the merger. Hence, the positive ex-
ternalities which the Outsider would gain in absence of this quantity limitation
are decreasing and the aggregate price remains high enough to make the merger
pro￿table for the Insiders.
We show that the solution of the Insider dilemma does not arise from the
endogenezation of the merger process, but depends on the nature of the com-
petition.
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the several bilateral merg-
ers observed in the industries where the merger size is exogenously decided.
19APPENDIX A
We will sketch the proofs of proposition 2, 6.
Proof of Proposition 2




















(n ￿ m + 2)
2 m
n > 0; (50)
since n ￿ m > 2:￿
Proof of Proposition 7 (computation)
This strategy pro￿le s3 is a Nash equilibrium for all ￿ satisfying the following
inequality:
(1 ￿ ￿3)max￿3 (ql;q3)
q3
+ ￿3￿C
3 < ￿3 (q￿
3;q￿
l ): (51)
We solve the Outsider￿ s maximization problem in the period in which it has
deviated. Since the other techniques used to solve (51) are only substitutions,
then we omit them.
max￿3 (ql;q3) =
q3
(a ￿ 2ql ￿ q3)q3 ￿ cq3 (52)
Since at stage 1, the Insiders have decide to merger and produce ql, then the











c ￿ ql; (54)
Now, to ￿nd the equilibrium quantities we solve the system between (54)





































that holds for every ￿3 > 0:15:￿
APPENDIX -B
We show that there exists an equilibrium in which the incentive to remain
Outsider is completely solved. To do that we proceed in two steps.
First step
We de￿ne the outcome in which the merger is strictly pro￿table for both
Insider and Outsider and the Insider￿ s dilemma is completely solved.
To do that we need to ￿nd the quantity the Outsider would have to produce
to gain a pro￿t at least equal to the standard Cournot triopoly one but lower
than the pro￿t of the Insider.
We assume that the Insiders do not change the production respect to the


































where ￿ 2 [0;1].
The LHS of (60) represents the Outsider￿ s pro￿t function when the two
Insiders produce the quantity given in (59).
21The ￿rst term in the RHS is the standard Cournot pro￿t with three ￿rms,
the term in brackets is the di⁄erence between the post-standard merger pro￿t
de￿ned in (17) and the Cournot one.
The Outsider￿ s quantity q
￿
3 solving the identity (60) is the following:
q
￿

































































































































































1 ￿ ￿ + 1
￿


















We characterizing such market outcome as equilibrium. We rewrite the









. Following the same proof of
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